University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1959

Davis: Administrative Law Treatise--A Symposium
Review
Charles E. Clark

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Clark, Charles E., "Davis: Administrative Law Treatise--A Symposium Review" (1959). Minnesota Law Review. 1016.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1016

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Davis: Administrative Law
Treatise-A Symposium Reviewt
The Review takes great pleasure in presenting the following reviews of Professor Kenneth Culp Davies recently
published Administrative Law Treatise. Seeking to convey
the reactions of those most concerned with this publication, we present here the considered thoughts of four of
the men most eminently qualified to evaluate this new
work, and who are also representative of the four most
distinguishable professional interests- the judges, the
practitioners,the administrators,and the scholars.

A General Appraisal
Charles E. Clark*
FOR fifteen years or more Professor Davis has beeu writing
authoritative articles for the law reviews, each one covering some
important facet of administrative law. Having made himself both
architect and builder of this rapidly developing field of litigation
and of regulation, in 1951 he published his one-volume book which
was immediately recognized as the outstanding authority on the
subject. And now we have this sumptuous four-volume set expanding his previous work and bringing it down to date. I do not
find that his ideas have changed substantially; for present conclusions go back directly to the book and the articles. Nor need they,
so carefully were the originals developed. But the progression is
a useful one which may be commended to other legal writers; it
is in effect from an audience of scholars to the law schools generally and now to the law offices. As we have to realize, a four-volume set has a greater appeal to the managers of large-firm libraries
than can be expected for short texts or volumes of law reviews.
And this set is to be welcomed as the definitive expression of
views of the now recognized master of the subject It should have
the professional circulation it so amply deserves.
Professor Davis writes with vigor and decisiveness. His views
f ADMmnSmRATIV LAw TjxATSE. By Kenneth Gulp Davis. SL Paul: West Publishing Co., 1958. $70.00 (4 Vols.).
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
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are clearly stated and strongly advanced. Thus the reader has
here the inestimable privilege of having the results of a thinking
mind at work in a legal area of challenge and opportunity. This
therefore is anything but the "agglutinative" type of legal writing
so gently condemned by Cardozo in his famous essay on law and
literature.' I expect that is about all one can say profitably in a
to-be-read review of a work of these dimensions- that it is the
expression of deep thought and careful conclusions of an excellent scholar and as such is a boon and stimulus to all workers in
the field, be they judges, lawyers, or teachers. Whatever I may
add to this judgment can be at best only some gilding of the
lily as to points which have particularly stimulated my personal
interest and whose brief exploration may help to demonstrate
the richness of the work.
Professor Davis is a strong supporter and defender of the administrative process and of the agency type of business and social
regulator. He makes a convincing demonstration of the considerable amount of foolishness dispensed by so many bar leaders
against "our wonderland of bureaucracy," "administrative absolutism, the "new despotism," and all the other well-known clich6s
which now sound more than faintly ridiculous in perspective. Also
he shows how the development has gone on, notwithstanding attempts, on the whole rather ill-advised, to curb and block it. He
is no lover of the Administrative Procedure Act, but succeeds in
blunting its destructive trend by holding it largely declaratory.
He returns many times to a critique of the "ill-considered" recommendations of the Task Force of the second Hoover Commission
and its view of "consistent distrust of agencies."2 And his criticism
is direct of other ill-starred proposals as well as of various restrictive state decisions.
With his major position and the general case he builds I am
in thorough sympathy. Perhaps his enthusiasm may lead him to
understate how much the federal agencies do tend to reflect the
general economic view of the executive, and not of Congress. True,
they are independent in the sense that they are not to be ckntrolled directly by the executive- though recent investigations
in Washington have disclosed that personal connections and ties
do have their effect. But I am referring to the broader aspects
of change of underlying regulatory law with change of the executive. Thus a favorite iteration is that the gains of the New Deal
have been retained by later administrations. That is true so far as
1. CAnDozo, LAw AND LrrRarunE 10, 31-32 (1931).
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 1.04, at 31, 32 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIs]. This is the first of some twenty-five references to the Task Force of
the second Hoover Commission.
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outward forms are concerned; but there has been much undoing
even in the particular case of law previously settled and enforced
by the courts.' Even judges of naturally conservative bent are not
altogether happy in these rapid shifts in what has been advanced
as basic legal principle, and it is to be wondered whether Congress is fully briefed as to their extent Such play in the joints is
probably inevitable; true, it occurs to a considerable extent in the
courts themselves and is sure to be reflected in the more politically sensitive agencies. But I believe it would be better all around
if this were more thoroughly understood and more often explained,
and the vital significance of our electoral processes better apprehended. It must be conceded, however, that a professional law
text is hardly the most convenient vehicle for the analysis of these
political nuances.
Among dragons which the author faces head-on and slays are
the rule of law, the separation of powers, the delegation of power,
the iron requirement of hearing and assimilated court process, the
glorification of the hearing examiners, the rigid separation of functions, and the necessity of personal decision. I found all this rather
sprightly reading, notwithstanding the technical nature of the subject matter, because of Davis's gusto in attack. Here I must
insert a caveat against my own enthusiasm lest I give the impression that this is a highly explosive and crusading book. It is not;
indeed, it is restrained and quite legal in approach. But these are
among the technical doctrines widely employed to denigrate the administrative process. Hence for complete exposition of the present
status of administrative law they must be stated, explained, analyzed, and eventually reduced to the comparatively small role they
actually play in modern administrative adjudication. And this the
author does thoroughly and convincingly.
A particularly revealing example of the author's approach is the
long chapter on "institutional decisions" which first appeared in
article form in the Columbia Law Review for March 1948. 4 Here
is the heart of professional criticism of the administrative process-the anonymity of the decision-but, as we have to see, it
survives as a "mighty hardy animal." Davis asks ironically if its
3. iustrative cases are Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees v. NLRB, 245 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd, NLRB v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, 357 U.S.
345 (1958); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Rosenblum v. FTC,
214 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954). Compare Hutchins, Is Democracy Possible?, Saturday
Review, Feb. 21, 1959, p. 58:
And if a Federal agency is established to regulate us, never fear, we have the
pressure that will shortly make the agency the servant and mouthpiece of the
interests it was intended to control. And as we laughingly count our gains at the
expense of the public, we can reverently repeat the solemn incantation that
helped to make them possible: that government is best which governs least.
4. Davis, Institutional Administrative Decisions, 48 CoLUm. L. REv. 173 (1948).
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hardihood is "one of the diabolical features of a pernicious bureaucracy that threatens traditional concepts of procedural fair
play."' Of course the answer is to be found in the practicalities
of the situation. Various types of hearings call for the personal
decision of the official who has heard the case; this is ordinarily
true of cases in court. But there is much less occasion or need
when the administrative responsibility is to enforce a general congressional policy- of unionization, of supervision of security sales,
and so on. Here intelligent clerks can document the written evidence to see if the case falls into the typical groove and can do
so economically and expeditiously, whereas a requirement of exclusive agency or board action would paralyze regulation in view
of the great volume of work facing these important agencies - far
outdistancing all court activity. There have been many calls for
a rigid approach in the state courts also, such as New Jersey. But
in the main, common sense has prevailed and the agencies have
been allowed to function. And that is the rational answer actually
being made to this basic problem.
Many of the topics herein considered belong also in the main
body of the law, and the author draws on general principles for
the solution of administrative problems. Often these chapters are
brief treatises which have a broader application than the mere
subject in hand. One of the best is the chapter on evidence, which
well might be the basis also for treatment of evidence in the courts
of law. This would follow the principle of the Model Code and the
Uniform Rules that all relevant evidence should be admitted
unless barred by some quite specific rule of exclusion., Another
excellent chapter is that on "official notice" or "judicial notice" as
we understand it in court terminology. 7 Davis adopts in general
the view of the text writers that expansion of the usefulness of this
concept is in the interest of wise administration.
The law of procedure comes in for some acute examination,
which particularly centers on the appropriate parties in an administrative proceeding. Here we have some of the intricate rationales
upon "standing to sue" and the broad grants of some state practices as compared to the federal confusion. Davis argues for a
broad right of anyone injured and therefore supports as "the most
5. 2 DAvis § 11.01, at 38. See also Davis, supra note 4.
6. See 2 DAVIs §§ 14.01-.04. When Professor Davis skips to other fields than his
own, he may at times generalize too hastily, as where he accepts too readily a
superficial criticism of FED. R. Crv. P. 43(a) that it lacks precision of meaning and
overlooks the beneficial effect of its trend toward discretionary and broad admissibility. 2 DAvis at 267-68. See also the overbrief reference to interlocutory appeals.
3 id. § 20.05, at 87-88.
7. 2 id. ch. 15.
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comprehensive and penetrating opinion"8s that of Judge Frank upholding such a right in a decision which "may well be an instance
of the rare phenomenon of a lower court's decision superseding a
recent Supreme Court decision." 9 Another interesting discussion
occurs in connection with the enjoining of public officers and the
restriction on any right of suit against the government. The present unsatisfactory situation as to substitution of successor officers
comes in for consideration, with some criticism of the substitute
rule for rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1955. Professor Davis makes
the solution seem considerably simpler than it appeared to some of
us who have worked upon substitute drafts to solve the problem.' 0
There is a wealth of other fascinating material-on "primary"
and "secondary" jurisdiction, on the supposed necessity of exhausting all administrative remedies before resort to the courts, on
ripeness" of administrative action for review, upon unreviewable
a
itrative action, and upon the scope and standard of judicial review in general I can do no more than summarize to indicate the rich and varied content of the treatise. But before I close
I must refer to the author's (perhaps necessary) ambivalent attitude toward the Supreme Court. As he says in a Preface, which
he cherishes to the point of reprinting for separate distribution,
he hesitates to criticize because much recent criticism has been
unfortunate and the Court's total performance in recent decades
deserves admiration, rather than attack. But when he turns to
his particular field he finds a distressing lack of consistency, coupled
with a tendency to overgeneralization in the one case, subject to
repudiation or plain overlooking in the next case. Thus on the
question of superior officers as indispensable parties, he finds seven
opinions going in seven directions, an eighth restoring practicality,
8. 3 id. § 22.05, at 225.
9. Id. at 225 n.8, discussing Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d
Cir. 1943).
10. See id. § 27.09, at 608, 611, criticizing both proposals for easy substitution
of an official successor and for suit against an officer by his official title, and not by
name, and offering instead a version that, where the suit is "by or against the
government in reality," the substitution of a new nominal party is not required. This
I fear is both facile and academic; it bypasses completely the long history of sovereign immunity and the definite legacy of obstacles due in part to a mistake of the
Code revisers which the Advisory Committee faced. See, e.g., Vibra Brush Corp. v.
Schaffer, 256 F.2d 681, 683, 684 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1958); ADvisoRy Coim. o.- Rur.ms
FoR CrL PaoCEUrE, REPoRT or PRoPoSED AMNDE mTs To RUms oF CrVIL
PRocEDU
roR TE Dsmiicr CouRTs OF THE UNrE STATm, 28-33 (1955). The

Advisory Committee built on a rather solid historical foundation of the permissible
to develop a workable, rather than a purely theoretical, procedure; even the suit
against the office has come to be thoroughly recognized in certain instances, such as
"Commissioner of Internal Revenue," District Director," and the like. See ibid.
and late volumes of the Federal Reporter.
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but a ninth returning to the "old confusion," seemingly "with an
aura of indifference"" and with the Court destroying its own brain
child, "like the mother mink who eats her young.' 12 I can sympathize with a good deal of this impatience; I have had similar
reactions with the Supreme Court's approach to a specialty of my
own peculiar interest, civil procedure, although my concern is as
to the Court's diffidence, rather than its precipitousness, in the
field. 13 Perhaps such earnest exhortation to greater interest and
consistency may bring some results. But on the whole I think so
much discontent is rather naive and hardly consonant with the
normal expectations really to be associated with our federal system and the headship of the Supreme Court.
The difficulty goes back to our unusual reliance upon law as
the emollient to settle all matters and adjust all disputes, even
those of high social policy- the rule of law again- and the Sipreme Court as the chosen oracle to give all the answers. Thus
the Court has too much to do, both literally and figuratively. The
whole world properly looks to it for leadership in personal liberty,
individual equality, and all the great faiths which give our country reason and means to exist; while we lawyers expect it to define the procedures and processes of government- matters which,
however important they may be to us professionally, can hardly
loom as large as its major concern. I hope the Court accepts and
acts on Professor Davis's friendly advice. But even if it does not,
I think we must give thanks for what it is doing so superbly in
the modern age and expect that time will continue- as it has
done not altogether badly in the past-to iron out the kinks in
effective details of procedure of government agencies as well as
of courts. Meanwhile we can accept with pleasure the monumental
aid to enlightenment and understanding action afforded by this
fine work of scholarship.
11. Preface to 1 DAvis at vi.
12. 3 id. § 27.08, at 597. Also particularly criticized is the confusion in the decisions as to a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies before appeal to
the courts. See Preface to I id. at vii; 3 id. §§ 20.01-04; and the scope of judicial

review, Preface to 1 id. at viii; 4 id. §§ 30.05-.07.
13. Thus I have tried to point out that the Court has actually shown more leadership in the field of procedural reform than it has properly been credited or appar-

ently is willing to credit itself, and that it is more fitted for such leadership than it
appears to assume. See Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 435, 437-42, 444 (1958). So the Judicial Conference of the United States

has not supported proposals to substitute itself for the Court. See

ANNUAL RE-'OuT olr
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1957, at
7-8 (1958); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
Trm UNITED STATES, 1958, at 6-7 (1959).

